Designadamente, Marcelo

O veto ao decreto-lei dos professores não corresponde ao episódio mais grave na presidência de Marcelo. Longe, anos-luz, disso. Esse feito consistiu na chantagem pública sobre Costa para forçar a demissão de Galamba, com isso abrindo uma crise política abstrusa e insana onde arriscou levar o País para eleições. Mas esta cena patareca de vetar incoerentemente o diploma do Governo sobre a progressão na carreira, e depois vir anunciar a sua aprovação por causa de uma palavra introduzida na nova versão, gerou um consenso. Da esquerda à direita. É a consciência de estarmos perante uma desgraça.

Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa foi uma das figuras mais populares dos últimos 25 anos, tendo gerado um consenso simétrico: tinha graça. Não só pela verve engraçada, perfeita para sobressair encantadora no meio televisão, mas também pelo fenómeno de cair em graça, onde ele representava ecumenicamente a faceta pacífica do 25 de Abril, em que as elites da ditadura foram quase todas assimiladas pela democracia de um dia para o outro. Depois da fase jornaleira-tonteira, e de uma passagem pela política partidária onde morreu na praia, seria na política-espectáculo — ou seja, no entretenimento — que Marcelo viria a criar uma poderosíssima marca pessoal. Montado nela, achou que podia ir brincar aos reis para Belém. Afinal, já tinha feito o curso de aprendiz de D. Carlos em Cascais, seria uma pena se perdesse a oportunidade escancarada.

As suas vitórias nas presidenciais foram passeios sem concorrência. No primeiro mandato, mostrou sentido de Estado e protegeu o interesse nacional e o bem comum. Apesar disso, não resistiu a armar-se em Presidente do Governo no caso de Constança Urbano de Sousa. E depois veio o segundo mandato, onde ficou assarapantado com a surpresa da maioria absoluta. Os disparates e erros políticos começaram logo na tomada de posse com o ataque ao carácter de Costa a propósito de uma hipotética saída do primeiro-ministro a meio de mandato. E foram em crescendo, com o desnorte completo a respeito dos abusos sexuais na Igreja Católica pelo meio, estando poucos meses depois a iniciar o período alucinado de ameaças semanais de dissolução da Assembleia da República não tendo o Governo sequer completado um ano na sua legislatura, nem havendo a mínima razão para se aplicar o drástico e inaudito recurso institucional. A primeira consequência do não só errático como disfuncional comportamento presidencial é a perda de autoridade da sua palavra, a que se segue a tangível suspeita de não estar à altura das suas responsabilidades.

Ninguém consegue associar o nome Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa a alguma ideia política que valha a pena discutir, apesar das décadas todas em palco. Ele não foi paladino de qualquer causa memorável, tendo usado os sem-abrigo apenas como operação de marketing de cariz católico para gasto na primeira metade do seu primeiro mandato. E mais nada. Nem a respeito da crise e escândalos (leia-se: crimes) na Justiça ele mexe uma palha, sendo o ocupante de Belém mais académica e profissionalmente preparado para o fazer. Limita-se aos chavões para gasto mediático. Toda a energia que o habita esgota-se na fruição da sua pessoa — e isso vem sendo cada vez mais evidente, e cada vez mais obsceno.

Não nasceu para estar nas muralhas da cidade. É um local muito solitário, e muito exposto às intempéries e aos ruins. Num estúdio de televisão, ou no beijinho popular, é que ele se sente bem. No trono.

25 thoughts on “Designadamente, Marcelo”

  1. A quantidade daqueles que realmente tenta ocupar o topo das hierarquias é sempre ínfima na comparação com os outros que apenas ameaçam ou fantasiam o mesmo, mais os restantes que nem sequer gastam uma caloria para lá chegar. Estes preferem ficar equilibrados em cima da “muralha”, sem nunca escolher um lado ou o outro, a fazer cabriolas. Sabem o que lhes acontece quando porventura caem?

  2. !pôrra!, impossível não esquissar um sorriso, que texto maravilhoso sobre uma não maravilha. mas também fico triste com estas verdades: temos um troneiro inútil e incapaz de lutar pela Cidade que lhe deu o trono e a coroa; temos um obeso de vaidade que se move a pastéis em belém. e a família que continua a assobiar para o lado da sua caminhada de demência, está de ininterruptas férias? negligência gera negligência, filhos que se recusam a serem pais do pai.

  3. estão bem uns para os outros. não se percebe essa exigência do pr ser melhor. é mais um da manada ou boiada, gente sem qualquer interesse e que vive ainda num nível muito baixo.

  4. a Alexandra leitão falou muito bem sobre isso. foi quem gostei mais de ouvir.

    na questão dos professores Marcelo levou (novamente) uma chapada de luva branca por parte de Costa. o governo em duas horas resolveu a promulgação de uma maneira exemplaríssima.

  5. Não li o lençol mas dá pra imaginar. Se fosse comigo era pior. Ia o Costa e o Santos a pontapé e à bofetada. Gostou ?
    Se não gostou, emigre pra Free Lancer, o país fica a seguir à RTP, ou então faça um golpe de estado, como deve ser, com tropas, não é com paleio vazio. Esse.

  6. Sr. Valupi,
    Não bastará analisar bem as posições políticas de Marcelo para que se possa considerar um estreme defensor do Estado de Direito Democrático.
    Para que se aperceba do seu notório maniqueísmo, sugiro-lhe ouvir a entrevista feita por Aaron Maté a John Mearsheimer, atentando especialmente ma passagem que transcrevo..

    ” Você tem que ter uma espécie de mercado de ideias se quiser ter políticas inteligentes, porque o fato é que os governos muitas vezes fazem coisas estúpidas ou seguem políticas que parecem corretas no momento, mas se mostram desastrosas, e você deseja que muitas pessoas que discordam dessas políticas tenham a oportunidade de expressar suas opiniões antes e depois do lançamento da política. Mas hoje em dia, isso é muito difícil de fazer, e isso é muito deprimente e angustiante.”

    ” You have to have some semblance of a marketplace of ideas if you want to have smart policies, because the fact is that governments often times do stupid things, or they pursue policies that look like they’re correct at the time but prove to be disastrous, and you want to have lots of people who disagree with those policies having an opportunity to voice their opinions before the policy is launched and after the policy is launched. But in this day and age, that’s very difficult to do, and that’s very depressing and distressing.”

    (https://thegrayzone.com/2023/07/30/john-mearsheimer-ukraine-war-is-a-long-term-danger/ )

  7. acontece que à velocidade que muda hoje a realidade a governação é mais nefasta do que alguma vez foi. a lentidão legislativa ´não é compatível com mudanças rápidas. além disso legislam em cima do joelho. ouvem falar de IA , da perda de empregos e continuam a mandar resmas de gente para as universidades. nem sequer percebem porque os donos disto tudo mandam escrever” comunicados ” na imprensa sobre semanas de trabalho de 3 e 4 dias e rendimentos universais garantidos..

  8. não têm qualquer capacidade de visão a longo prazo , incorporando as novas variáveis que já aqui estão. continuam como se estivessem no século xx. no pasa nada…

  9. JA, a “conversa” entre Aaron Maté e John Mearsheimer, no link que ofereces, é límpida, lúcida e esclarecedora, mas não esperes que o Valupi, a Penélope ou algum dos turistas descabeçados que por aqui debitam inanidades percam tempo a lê-la. É muita areia para aquelas camionetas, areia branquinha e limpinha. Eles preferem praias junto a saídas de esgoto e areia com abundância de coliformes fecais. Areia enriquecida, vitaminada, pensam eles de que, e por isso se desfazem constantemente em caganeira.

  10. AARON MATÉ: Well, speaking of which, that was your famous warning back in 2015, that the West is leading Ukraine down the primrose path and, according to you, the end result is that Ukraine is going to get wrecked.

    JOHN MEARSHEIMER: What’s going on here is that the West is leading Ukraine down the primrose path, and the end result is that Ukraine is going to get wrecked. And I believe that the policy that I’m advocating, which is neutralizing Ukraine and then building it up economically and getting it out of the competition between Russia on one side and NATO on the other side, is the best thing that could happen to the Ukrainians.

    AARON MATÉ: This was your warning back in 2015. Why were you so confident of this? What made you so sure that this was the inevitable path?

    JOHN MEARSHEIMER: Well, I thought it was very clear when the crisis first broke out in February 2014. Remember the crisis breaks out on February 22, 2014, and at that point in time it’s clear that the Russians view Ukraine in NATO as an existential threat. They make no bones about that. And furthermore, it’s clear that if we persist to try to bring Ukraine into NATO, if we persist to try to make Ukraine a Western bulwark on Russia’s borders, that the Russians will destroy Ukraine, they’ll wreck Ukraine. They make that clear at the time.

    So, that’s in 2014, and then if you look at what happens from 2014 up till 2022, when the war breaks out, when it goes from being a crisis to a war, if you look at what happens then, the Russians make it clear, at point after point, that Ukraine in NATO is an existential threat, but what do we do? We double down at every turn. We continue to commit ourselves more forcefully each year to bringing Ukraine into NATO. And my view in the very beginning was that this was going to lead to disaster.

    Now, a lot of people like to portray my views as anomalous. I’m one of a handful of people, folks like me, Jeffrey Sachs, Steve Cohen [Stephen F. Cohen], who make these kinds of arguments. But if you think about it, back in the 1990s, when the subject of NATO expansion was being debated, there were a large number of very prominent members of the foreign policy establishment who said that NATO expansion would end up in disaster. This included people like George Kennan, William Perry—who at the time was the Secretary of Defense.

    AARON MATÉ: He almost resigned, he says.

    JOHN MEARSHEIMER: Pardon?

    AARON MATÉ: He almost resigned, he says, over the issue of NATO expansion. When Clinton expanded NATO, he said he considered resigning, I believe.

    JOHN MEARSHEIMER: Yes, that’s exactly right. And, by the way, there was widespread opposition to NATO expansion inside the Pentagon at that point in time. And all this is to say that those people were right.

    And one of my favorite examples is Angela Merkel. When the decision was made in April 2008 at the Bucharest Summit—the Bucharest NATO Summit—to bring Ukraine into NATO, Angela Merkel and Nicholas Sarkozy, who was then the French leader, both of them were adamantly opposed to bringing Ukraine into NATO. This is when the trouble started, April 2008. Angela Merkel was bitterly opposed, and she subsequently said that the reason that she was opposed was that she understood that Putin would interpret it as a declaration of war. Just think about that. Angela Merkel said that in 2008, when she opposed the idea of bringing Ukraine—and Georgia, by the way—into NATO, she opposed it. She opposed it because she understood that Putin would interpret it as a declaration of war. So, there are a lot of people besides Jeff Sachs, Steve Cohen, and John Mearsheimer who understood that this whole crusade to expand NATO eastward was going to end up in disaster.

  11. AARON MATÉ: A major goal of Russia is, it seems to me, on top of getting Ukraine to commit to neutrality, to not joining NATO, was to get Ukraine to implement the Minsk Accords—the deal that it had signed back in 2015 to end the war in the Donbass. And I’m wondering what you make of the admissions that have come out since Russia invaded, from NATO leaders like Angela Merkel of Germany and François Hollande of France, who helped broker the Minsk Accords, where they said—and this mirrors what Ukrainian leaders like [Petro] Poroshenko said, too—that Minsk wasn’t intended to actually make peace; it was intended to buy time for Ukraine to build up its military to fight the Russian-backed rebels in the east of Ukraine and Russia itself. Do you buy that from Merkel and Hollande, or do you think they’re maybe just trying to save face and reject criticism from hawks who believe that their efforts to try to broker peace and end the war on the Donbass somehow enabled Russia and Putin?

    JOHN MEARSHEIMER: It’s really hard to know what to think, for sure. I mean, the fact is that Hollande, Poroshenko, and Angela Merkel have all said very clearly that they were not serious at the time about negotiating some sort of settlement in accordance with the Minsk II guidelines. If they say that, it would seem to me to be true. Is it really the case that they’re all lying now to cover up their past behavior so that they don’t damage their reputations in the West? I guess that’s possible. I don’t know how you would prove one way or the other where the truth lies. But my tendency in these situations is to believe what people say, and if Angela Merkel tells me that she was just pretending in the Minsk negotiations because she wanted to help arm up the Ukrainians, I tend to believe her. But maybe she’s not telling the truth. Who knows for sure?

  12. AARON MATÉ: Finally, Russia has already annexed four Ukrainian oblasts during its invasion, on top of Crimea in 2014. You mentioned earlier that you think Russia wants to take more territory. Where do you think Russia would be satisfied stopping its incursions? Where do you think its territorial ambitions end?

    JOHN MEARSHEIMER: Well, on a very general level, Aaron, I think it’s important to understand that the Russians will want to take territory if they can do it militarily, and that remains to be seen. If they can do it militarily, they’ll want to take territory that has lots of Russian speakers and ethnic Russians in them. This is why I think they’ll take Odessa if they can, and Kharkiv if they can, and two other oblasts as well. But I think they will stay away from the oblasts or the areas of Ukraine that have lots of ethnic Ukrainians, because the resistance to a Russian occupation will be enormous. So, I think the demography of Ukraine limits how much territory the Russians can take.

    Furthermore, I think military capability limits how much of Ukraine that they can take—that they don’t have the military capability to take all of it. And I think they’ll have to actually increase the size of the existing Russian army if they’re going to take the four oblasts. This includes Kharkiv and Odessa that are to the west of the four oblasts that they now control. But I think that they will try to take those eight oblasts, plus Crimea. Those eight oblasts, they already control four and they’ve taken Crimea; that represents about 23 percent of Ukrainian territory, before 2014. If they take the additional four oblasts to the west of the four they now have annexed, that will represent about 43 percent of Ukrainian territory that will have fallen into the hands of the Russians. And that I think will leave the Russians in a position where they are dealing with a Ukraine that is a truly dysfunctional state.

    I hate to say that this is the likely outcome because it’s a such a terrible outcome from Ukraine’s point of view, but I think in all honesty that that is where this war is headed. I think the Russians are now playing hardball, where, as I said to you before, well past the situation that existed in March of 2022, or certainly in the period before the war broke out in February of 2022, where it’s possible to imagine a situation where the Russians pulled out of Ukraine in return for Ukrainian neutrality. Those days are gone, and a Russia that’s playing hardball is a Russia that’s going to conquer more territory if it can and do everything it can to wreck Ukraine.

  13. AARON MATÉ: One more question, because we haven’t discussed this issue yet and it’s existential, and that’s the nuclear threat. There was a recent article by a Russian namedSergei Karaganov, who was an academic with the Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy. He’s said to be close to Putin. And I don’t know if you caught this essay, but he basically said that Russia needs to adopt a more bellicose nuclear posture, needs to embrace the use of First Use, and even threaten to use it in Ukraine in order to sufficiently scare the West. I don’t know if you caught that essay, but if you did, what did you make of it? And overall, is the nuclear threat, the threat of nuclear war something that you think is still a possibility when it comes to this war itself?

    JOHN MEARSHEIMER: Well, I think that nuclear war is most likely if the Russians are losing. If the Russians are losing, if the Ukrainian military is rolling up Russian forces in eastern and southern Ukraine, and the sanctions are working and the Russians are on the verge of being knocked out of the ranks of the great powers, in that situation I think it’s likely that the Russians would turn to nuclear weapons, and they would use those nuclear weapons in Ukraine. They would not dare use them against NATO, but they would turn to nuclear weapons. I think, given the fact that the Russians are not losing and, if anything, are winning, therefore the likelihood of nuclear war is greatly reduced. I don’t want to say it’s been taken off the table for one second, but I think as long as the Russians are on the upside of the battle, not on the downside, the likelihood of nuclear use is very low.

    Now, with regard to the Karaganov article, I read that to say that the Russians are likely to prevail, but to use rhetoric I’ve used, it’s going to be an ugly victory. I think he understands that the Russians are not going to win a decisive victory. They’re not going to end up with a neutral Ukraine, and they’re not going to end up in a situation where the West backs off. I think that Karaganov understands that even if the Russians capture more territory, and even if they turn Ukraine into a dysfunctional rump state, that you’re going to get at best a cold peace that’s going to be very dangerous. I referred to this in my Substack article as an ugly victory. And I think what he is basically saying is that it’s not clear that’s acceptable to the Russians over the long term. It’s not clear that Russia can afford to live in such circumstances over the long term. And if Russia were to use nuclear weapons, it might be a way of sending a wake-up message to the West. It might be a way of telling the West that they have to back off.

    In other words, what’s going on here is Karaganov is talking about using nuclear weapons for coercive purposes. He’s interested in limited nuclear use for the purpose of getting the West to back off, getting the West to change its behavior and put an end to this ugly victory, and allow the Russians to have some sort of meaningful victory and to help create some sort of meaningful peace agreement. I think that he is right. The Russians at best can win an ugly victory. I think it’s just important to understand that. He senses, I think, quite correctly, the Russians are not going to win a decisive defeat. There’s no real happy ending to this story, that’s what he’s saying. And he’s saying that’s probably not acceptable, and we’ve got to figure out a way to move beyond a cold peace, and nuclear coercion may be a way to do that.

    Now, is that an argument that’s likely to sell? I think it’s impossible to say, because we don’t know exactly what an ugly victory will look like, number one. Number two, we don’t know who will be in control in Russia in the future, who will have his or her finger on the trigger in Moscow when this ugly victory is becoming almost intolerable, and we certainly don’t know whether that person would be bold enough to countenance using nuclear weapons.

    Is that possible, that someone might countenance using nuclear weapons, because Russia is in an intolerable situation? Yes, it’s one, but it’s an ugly victory, and that’s not acceptable. It is possible. I think there’s a non-trivial chance that there’ll be someone like Sergei Karaganov in power and who will think about using nuclear weapons. I bet that that will not happen, but who knows for sure? As you well know, it’s incredibly difficult to predict the future, especially when you’re talking about scenarios like that. But I think that’s what’s going on here—and again this just highlights how much trouble we’re in, no matter how this war turns out. As I said before, if the Russians are losing, I mean, they’re seriously losing the war, that’s where nuclear use is likely. And what Karaganov is saying is, even if we win it’s going to be an ugly victory and we may have to use nuclear weapons anyway. You want to think about where that leaves us.

    And then there’s the whole question of, if Ukraine is really losing, let’s assume that the Ukrainian military cracks, let’s assume that the beating that it’s taking leads to a situation like the one that faced the French army in the spring of 1917—this is when the French army cracked, it’s when the French army mutinied—let’s assume that that happens, and the Ukrainians are on the run. Again, I’m not saying that’s going to happen, but it is a possibility. What is NATO going to do? Are we going to accept the situation where Ukraine is being defeated on the battlefield in a serious way by the Russians? I’m not so sure. And it may be possible in those circumstances that NATO will come into the fight. It may be possible that the Poles decide that they alone have to come into the fight, and once the Poles come into the fight in a very important way, that may bring us into the fight, and then you have a great power war involving the United States on one side and the Russians on the other. Again, I’m not saying this is likely, but it is a possibility. What we are doing here is, we’re spinning out plausible scenarios as to how this war can play out over time. And almost all the scenarios that one comes up with have an unhappy ending. Again, this just shows what a huge mistake we made not trying to settle this conflict before February 24, 2022.

  14. Claro que o Valupi prefere ler o Tucídides de cabeça para baixo e largar uns bitaites bué de eruditos pour épater le bourgeois. Bué de eruditos, mas ao que parece disléxicos. Certamente por acaso, os dois autores que já vi invocarem Tucídides para interpretar acontecimentos contemporâneos punham as sucessivas luminárias ao leme do império do bem no lugar onde ele coloca o Putin. Não sei se o Valupi fez tropa, mas imagino-o no juramento de bandeira, a marchar garbosamente na parada, com a mãezinha a assistir, orgulhosa, e a dizer aos outros pais e mães presentes:

    “O pelotão inteiro leva o passo trocado, o meu filho é o único com o passo certo!”

  15. Mau sinal para Herr Zelensky von Pandora Papers. Está a tornar-se demasiado incómodo para as ocidentais praias e preparam-se para lhe fazer a folha. Como habitualmente acontece com os idiotas úteis, o peido final faz parte da sua utilidade e estará nela incluído, com o dedo convenientemente apontado ao mafarrico do Creme Lin, claro. Não que este não tencionasse fazer-lhe o mesmo um dia destes, mas não para já, penso eu de que, em que o palhaço estava a fritar em lume brando.

    https://youtu.be/8aiE1pW7Rtk

  16. Estou tão preocupado, mas tão preocupado com o holocausto nuclear que nem durmo. O jaquinzinho parece o palhaço rico “medevedev”. Estou é preocupado com algum holocausto na pesca dos jaquinzinhos. O que fazíamos ao arrozinho de feijão?!

  17. “Estou tão preocupado, mas tão preocupado com o holocausto nuclear que nem durmo”

    podias era ir pra lá lutar então, porque corajosos do sofá já temos que cheguem por aqui, obrigado.

  18. atão e porqué cus jaqu????zinhos nã criam um beloogue e cagam lá toda essa narrativa em lingua de cão e se entreteem mais as cyos e os mcócó em vez de virem prá qui empatar é ca gente tem candar a cagar os sapatos todos nessa mexordia queles dêtam por a cloaca que tem por baixo da tromba, ó desculpe nariz de porco, para se chegar ao real assunto que aqui nos trôsse. ????https://raw.githubusercontent.com/johannhof/emoji-helper/master/shared/img/emoji/middle_finger.png

  19. Belissimo trabalho de Joaquim Camacho de traducäo. E muito importante, O que é preciso é alargar a
    iniciativa capital de Informacäo. Seymour Hersh retomou também o seu blogue. No ultimo texto publicado ontem ele frisa que ” morrem cada vez mais pessoas nessa guerra sem sentido ” numa escala de 400/1OOO por dia na proporcäo de 1 russo para 10 ukr. e o ” exercito ucraniano näo con-
    seguiu ainda atravessar a primeira das trincheiras russas : por cada mina despoletada pelos ukries os russos colocam outra ao cair da noite…”. Salut! Niet

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